

Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 995-96/42

**INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS TO  
SUPPORT THE ARMY STRATEGIC MO-  
BILITY PROGRAM**

---

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES  
SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
SEPTEMBER 12, 1996



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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1996

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## **INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,  
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, September 12, 1996.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. HEFLEY. The subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities meets today to examine in more detail the most significant operational infrastructure requirement for the Department of the Army. The Army Strategic Mobility Program is the Army program implementing the recommendations of the "Mobility Requirements Study," a study mandated by Congress and completed in 1992. That study, in addition to the Bottom-Up Review, completed against the backdrop of both Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the beginning of the defense drawdown, generated considerable planning to shore up deficiencies in U.S. strategic mobility.

Beginning with fiscal year 1993 and continuing through fiscal year 2003, the Army intends to commit over \$5.3 billion towards all of its strategic mobility requirements. Of that amount, under current planning assumptions, the Army expects to expend approximately \$1.1 billion in facilities and infrastructure improvements to support strategic mobility. Put another way, 20 percent of the mobility requirement is in infrastructure. Without improvements to rail and outloading facilities, airfields, contingency storage facilities, and ammunition storage facilities, planned deployment timeliness cannot be met. As the Army has become less of a forward-deployed force and more of a CONUS-based force, power projection and the ability to deliver troops to the battlefield in the early stages of the conflict is critical.

As a class of facilities, Army strategic mobility facilities are in somewhat better shape than the rest of the Army inventory. Overall facilities quality data provided to the subcommittee earlier this year indicate that, while housing, mission facilities, community facilities, and utility systems were each, as a class, rated C3, Army strategic mobility facilities were rated C2. Better, but clearly not where we need to be.

With the submission of the fiscal year 1998 budget request early next year, the Army hopes to be on a path to buy out its major strategic mobility requirements over the course of the next future years defense program. Over the fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2003 period, the Army intends to program \$591 million in military construction projects to support strategic mobility and another \$228 million in operations and maintenance funding.

This subcommittee is concerned about both the stability of funding for the military construction program in the outyears and the adequacy of funding contemplated by the administration to meet the demands of improving the quality of life for unaccompanied personnel and military families while also modernizing and recapitalizing basic infrastructure and operational facilities. There are a host of competing priorities for what seem to be fewer and fewer dollars. While the infrastructure portion of the Army Strategic Mobility Program is an extremely high priority, I am not yet convinced that the program will stay entirely on track. Based on the records since I have been a member of the Committee on National Security, outyear dollars for military construction never seem to be there when the time comes.

To discuss the doctrinal basis for our current approach to strategic mobility, the operational requirement, and the infrastructure tail supporting it, we have with us today a distinguished panel of senior Army officers charged with the responsibility to develop and execute the infrastructure requirement to support strategic mobility. I want to welcome once again to the subcommittee Maj. Gen. Frank Miller, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. I also want to recognize the other members of the panel who are appearing before the subcommittee for the first time. Maj. Gen. Charles Mahan is director of supply and maintenance in the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Brig. Gen. Howard von Kaenel is deputy director of the strategy, plans, and policy directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

Again, I want to welcome each of you to the subcommittee this afternoon and we look forward to the discussion, and before going on with the panel, I would like to recognize Mr. Ortiz, the ranking member of this committee for any statement he might have.

**STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Hefley, I want to thank you for calling this important hearing today to review the military construction and infrastructure requirements necessary to support the Army Strategic Mobility Program. I appreciate your leadership in providing the subcommittee an opportunity to focus on the Army program, its justification, scope, and cost growth.

I welcome all of our witnesses this afternoon and look forward to their expert testimony.

The infrastructure requirements of the Army Strategic Mobility Plan represents a major commitment of military construction funds over the next 5 years. I believe that it is important that this subcommittee focus on this plan and the funding necessary for success-



ful implementation. This is a program that will require diligent oversight to ensure that our limited construction dollars are well spent. We must be sure that our priorities are in agreement so that we do not end up with a funding crisis down the road.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions regarding the Army Strategic Mobility Plan and look forward to this as a first of many meetings with the Army leadership on its military construction requirements. And again, welcome to this subcommittee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. We do not have to be real formal today, but I would like to turn it over to you all. General Miller, who is going to be first to lead off?

General MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I will lead off.

Mr. HEFLEY. All right, good.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FRANK MILLER, JR., ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. CHARLES S. MAHAN, JR., DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS AND BRIG. GEN. HOWARD J. VON KAENEL, DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND POLICY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS**

General MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ortiz, again I am Maj. Gen. Frank Miller, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. With me today, as the chairman has already addressed, is Maj. Gen. Mahan from DCSLOG and Brig. Gen. von Kaenel from DESOPS.

It is an honor to appear before you to discuss strategic mobility and the significant progress we are making to improve the ability of Army units to get from fort to foxhole. In particular, we will discuss the Army's Strategic Mobility Program. We call it ASMP which implements our strategic mobility plan.

The Army's strategic vision is a power projection force capable of achieving decisive victory across the continuum of military operations. Strategic mobility is the linchpin to achieve this vision and comprises a triad of capabilities—airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment. We have embarked on a multiyear, multisourced program that complements the Air Force's C-17 Program and the Navy's Strategic Sealift Program. Overseas we are positioning brigade sets of equipment in central Europe, Italy, Kuwait, Qatar, and Korea. In coordination with our allies, we have achieved agreements for host nation support for the construction and maintenance of facilities for this equipment. The Qatar agreement, however, only addresses maintenance of facilities.

The Army's prepositioned afloat package provides the combat power to counter the risk generated between the onset of hostilities and the arrival of the Army's heavy divisions. It gives the Army the unique capability of establishing and sustaining a significant armored force inland that is capable of operating at great distances from ports.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, as the chairman has already articulated, we experienced significant problems due to deteriorated rail and road networks, insufficient marshaling yards, stag-

ing areas, and inadequate facilities on our key mobilization and deployment installation. Example, the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, GA, used primitive loading docks which were held up by bulldozers. Open fields were used as marshaling yards. And because there was no storage capability, the unit's basic load of ammunition was in Bluegrass Army Depot, KY. It had to be transported to the unit before it could deploy. The deployment of the 101st Air Assault Division at Fort Campbell was impeded by an old rail system that lacked proper curvature, could not handle the heavy load, resulting in derailments. In addition, the air field pavement did not stand up to the numerous aircraft landings and take-offs.

Sunny Point, NC, did not have a deep draft capability so ships departed with partial loads or loads were ferried out, obviously a time-consuming process. ASMP was designed to implement the recommendations of the congressionally mandated "Mobility Requirements Study" following Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

So far we have invested \$1.8 billion in resources to implement the ASMP Program. Over the next 6 years we programmed to invest another \$3.5 billion. Major initiatives include the lease and operation of prepositioned ships, maintenance of prepositioned cargo and equipment, procurement of containers and railcars, deployment readiness exercises, and infrastructure improvements on our power projection installations.

We must have ready access to significant and reliable road, rail, sea and air assets. However, the ability to transport forces by air and sea does not equal a deployable Army. Success depends on transforming Army installations into world class power projection platforms to serve as springboards for the projection of forces. We have embarked on a program designed to modernize and enhance our logistic, operational, and infrastructure facilities to meet our deployment timeline.

Charleston Naval Weapons Station is being upgraded to provide cyclical maintenance of equipment on the prepositioned ships currently stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This is a multiyear project that will begin operations in the next 2 weeks when the first maintenance rotation is scheduled. The facility will be fully operational by fiscal year 1999.

The "Mobility Requirements Study" recommended the ammunition throughput on the west coast be increased to equal that available on the east coast. We therefore plan to upgrade Concord Naval Weapons Station in California. We are dredging the terminal entrance at Sunny Point to accommodate deep draft ships to outload equipment and material. We are also constructing container holding facilities and repairing rail access to expedite transport to the port. Modern rail system and storage containers for equipment and supplies are key to efficient fort to port transportation. We gave funding priority to Fort Stewart in fiscal year 1994 to improve the container handling facility, marshalling area, railroad pass track, and to expand the ammunition supply point. We are upgrading the rail facilities at Fort Campbell and Fort Benning in fiscal year 1997.

Between fiscal years 1994 and 1997, we committed \$200 million in MCA construction funds, with an additional \$44 million in oper-

ation and maintenance Army funds or facilities renovation. This accounted for 8 percent of our total MCA program during that period. With the completion of comprehension studies at each deploying installation, we expect ASMP projects to account for 8 percent of our combined MCA and OMA program between fiscal year 1998 and 2003 and 6 percent overall from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 2003.

The transition from a forward-based Army to a CONUS-based Army places a tremendous demand on strategic mobility. The ability to rapidly deploy a tailored force at a moment's notice anywhere around the globe to respond to crises, whether to deter aggression or for humanitarian action, hinges on being able to get from fort to port in a timely manner. We have identified and fixed some of our major problems, but our program is still not finished. We are committed to modernize and upgrade our facilities and installations to be premier power projection platforms.

Our challenge as we continue our multiyear program to correct problems at key deployment installations and facilities is to identify projects that ensure rapid deployment capability while providing the greatest benefit within available resources. When this program is completed, the Army will be fully capable of meeting the rapid power projection timelines demanded of the National Military Strategy and certainty of world events.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. We are prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Miller follows:]

**RECORD VERSION**

**STATEMENT BY**

**MG FRANK L. MILLER, JR.  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT**

**BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
SECOND SESSION, 104TH CONGRESS**

**REGARDING**

**ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM  
(ASMP)**

**September 12, 1996**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED  
BY THE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

## MG Frank L. Miller, Jr.

Major General Frank L. Miller, Jr. was born in Atchison, Kansas on 27 January 1944 to MSG(R) and Mrs. Frank L. Miller. General Miller is currently serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army.

Immediately prior to this assignment, he served as the Deputy Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas. Prior to that assignment, he served as the Director of Operations, J-3, for the United States Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

General Miller entered the military in 1965 as a Private and attended the Field Artillery Officer Candidate School immediately after Basic Training. He was commissioned on 13 September 1966. General Miller holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from the University of Washington, and a Masters Degree in Systems Management from Troy State University.

After his initial assignment to Fort Lewis, Washington as a Basic Training Company Training Officer, General Miller served in the Republic of South Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. General Miller commanded field artillery batteries in the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Infantry Division. He served in South Korea as a staff officer at battalion and division level. While assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, General Miller also served as a battalion S3, and participated in four REFORGER exercises.

Upon graduating with distinction from the Command and General Staff College, General Miller was assigned as a battle staff team operations officer aboard the USCINCEUR Airborne Command Post. After promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, General Miller commanded the 1st Battalion, 35th Field Artillery at Fort Stewart Georgia. Following command, General Miller attended the Naval War College, where he again graduated with distinction and was promoted to Colonel.

General Miller served as Chief of Staff of the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, from July 1984 to July 1986. Subsequently, he assumed command of the 588th United States Army Artillery Group in Athens, Greece. Following command, General Miller was assigned as Chief of Staff of Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In June 1989, General Miller assumed command of III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill.

General Miller's Decorations and awards include: the Legion of Merit (with four Oak Leaf Clusters), the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star Medal with V device (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal with V device (with 19 Oak Leaf Clusters) the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters) the State of Georgia Meritorious Service Medal, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star.

General Miller is married to the former Paulette C. Duncan of Tacoma, Washington. The Millers have three children, Frank III, Michael, and Toni, and two grandchildren, Jonathan and Nicole.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss strategic mobility and the Army's Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP). Many actions are underway affecting force projection and closure and we are making significant progress toward improving the ability of Army units to get from fort to foxhole and take the fight wherever the situation demands.

Our statement is in two parts:

*PART I - STRATEGIC MOBILITY*

*PART II - ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM*

**PART I  
STRATEGIC MOBILITY**

Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, the Army has teamed with its DOD partners in conducting detailed reviews of National Security and National Military Strategy in order to better define the requirements for the next decade. You are all familiar with the 1992 Defense Mobility Requirements Study (DMRS), the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and the 1994-1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU). These studies established the military requirements which have been reflected in subsequent planning and Presidential Budget submissions. Your Army has reshaped itself over these intervening 5 years; it is now smaller than it has been since before the Korean War. Yet the Army retains a balanced overseas presence which fulfills the crucial peacetime engagement imperative of our strategy, while also transforming itself into the premier power projection force of choice, capable of rapidly deploying powerful, tailored force packages to deter or defeat regional hegemony, or to enforce a fragile peace and provide hope to emerging nations or allies of long standing.

**Army Commitment**

The Army's strategic vision is a power projection force capable of achieving decisive victory across the continuum of military operations. Strategic mobility is the linchpin to achieve this vision. We have embarked on a multi-year, multi-sourced



program which is focused on improving the fort to foxhole deployment efforts at 15 key CONUS power projection platforms serving the total Army's contingency force. We must have ready access to significant and reliable road, rail, sea, and air transportation assets. We must also have equipment prepositioned to project power. Finally, we must improve the infrastructure at our power projection installations across the US to guarantee we can prepare and deploy our forces rapidly. The Army views strategic mobility as a triad of capabilities: Airlift, Sealift and Prepositioned Equipment

### **Airlift Program**

The Airlift program is well underway as a result of the November 1995 decision to procure 120 C-17s. As you know, this acquisition program is destined to replace the aging C-141 fleet. One only needs to observe the case study example of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia to appreciate the magnificent capabilities of the C-17. The Army wholeheartedly supports the USAF C-17 full-program buy along with multi-year procurements to accelerate the fielding of the C-17 in a fiscally responsible manner.

### **Sealift Program**

In a crisis, the Army is required to provide a Unified CINC two CONUS-based heavy divisions, 3.1 million sq ft of equipment, plus the echelons above division combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, 3.6 million sq ft of equipment, within 30 days from US ports. This surge capability is in addition to the Army War Reserve-3 (AWR-3) prepositioned heavy brigade with support, 2 million sq ft of equipment. The AWR-3 equipment will be on eight Large, Medium Speed Roll-on, Roll-off (LMSR) ships; however, all of the CONUS equipment must be moved by "surge" sealift, which is sealift immediately available to the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in an emergency.

The three component parts of this "surge" sealift Center of Gravity (COG) are: eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) which are on hand in the fleet; eleven LMSRs, all but two are already contracted or with options to build; and thirty-six Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships, of which thirty-one are on hand. While the sealift procurement program is improving, this surge sealift remains the COG for a power projection strategy.

In addition to the eleven LMSRs for surge, eight additional LMSRs are required for the AWR-3 to achieve the planned objective endstate of 2 million square feet of



equipment prepositioned afloat. The first two new LMSRs, the USNS Shughart and the USNS Gordon, have been delivered to the Navy. The Shughart is currently undergoing its operational test and evaluation. With these ships, the Army will begin transloading its afloat prepositioned equipment sets from older RO/ROs. If the delivery of LMSRs continues as currently scheduled, the Army's afloat prepositioned equipment sets will be complete in late 1999, while the eleven surge sealift LMSRs will be ready in 2001.

The final outstanding procurement issue remains the acquisition of the last five RO/ROs for surge sealift. The Chairman, JCS as well as Unified and Specified Commanders have testified to the Congress that the strategic lift program remains the most important enhancement to meet the National Military Strategy. The Army steadfastly supports the procurement of these last five RO/ROs, over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

### **Global Prepositioning Strategy**

The Army's Global Prepositioning Strategy is moving forward apace in support of the ways and means of our National Military Strategy. Although a relatively small overseas presence, our prepositioned equipment sets contribute substantively to forward engagement with our allies in vital regions of the world. By this traditional role of forward engagement, the Army demonstrates US commitment to its allies and maintains peace with its forces, ready on 18 hours notification, to begin the deployment of heavy or light brigade forces. The Army's GPPS calls for eight heavy brigade unit equipment sets (BENELUX-2, Italy-1, Qatar-1, Kuwait-1, Korea-1, Afloat-1, to be determined-1). The status of these prepositioned sets follows:

In the US European Command's area of operation, the Army is drawing down from four brigades, a division base and echelons above division unit sets to an endstate of two brigade sets of equipment in the Central Region; i.e., Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. Each of these brigade sets consists of two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion, approximately 120 Abrams tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles. There is a battalion of self-propelled 155mm howitzers prepositioned with the US Marine Corps' brigade set of equipment in Norway. There is also a brigade set in the Southern Region, Italy, consisting of two armored battalions and two mechanized battalions, approximately 120 Abrams tanks and 116 Bradley fighting vehicles. The Army's unit sets of prepositioned equipment not required in the Central Region are being redistributed to fill the Army's other requirements around the globe. Currently, some of this equipment is

being used in Operation Joint Endeavor, e.g., bridging, heavy equipment transporters, and HMMWVs.

In the US Central Command's area of operations, the Army has a brigade set of equipment in Kuwait of two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion, 120 Abrams tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles. In the Fall of 1995, the Army added a Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) battery to the set in Kuwait. There is also a heavy battalion task force set of equipment, in Qatar consisting of 30 Abrams tanks and 28 Bradley fighting vehicles. This is the lead battalion set for the second heavy brigade, two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion, and co-located division base set programmed for this region.

In Korea, the Army is establishing a prepositioned heavy brigade set of two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion, 120 Abrams tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles. All of the Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles are in Korea. The remainder of the equipment for prepositioning is enroute to Korea from redistribution of stocks in Europe.

The Army's prepositioned afloat set of equipment consists of one brigade set of two armored battalions and two mechanized battalions, 123 Abrams tanks and 116 Bradley fighting vehicles, loaded on five RO/ROs; a theater opening set of equipment loaded on two RO/ROs; a port opening set of equipment loaded on a Heavy Lift Prepositioned Ship and a T-class Auxiliary Crane Ship; and sustainment stocks loaded on five container or "Lighter Aboard Ship" (LASH) ships. In February 1997, the Army will begin transloading afloat prepositioned equipment from RO/ROs to the USNS Shughart. This transloading will continue as LMSRs are delivered.

The location for the eighth brigade unit equipment set is still under study by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee.

### **Host Nation MILCON Support**

All Military Construction (MILCON) for prepositioned sets in the European area of operations is eligible for funding through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Security Investment Program. No new MILCON is required in the Central Region, which comprises Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; however, the US has submitted several upgrades and restoration projects at the endstate sites to NATO for approximately \$16,000,000 over a 5-year period. New construction of approximately

\$40,000,000 is required to support a brigade set in the Southern Region, Italy. The NATO Military Committee recently approved this expenditure. In addition, under the 1992 Holmes Initiative, NATO agreed to consider 100 percent of the annual operations and maintenance expenditures at prepositioned equipment sites eligible for NATO common funding.

Individual host nations provide MILCON support in the US Central Command's area of operations. The level of support varies from country to country based on current agreements and economic capability. State Department negotiations are on-going for additional host nation support. The Kuwait host nation MILCON contribution of \$218,000,000 fully funds the on-going project for US facilities. Kuwait also fully funds US personnel and exercise requirements in their country.

In Qatar, you approved funding of \$64,000,000 for Fiscal Year 1997 in addition to the \$48,000,000 you approved in the Fiscal Year 1996 MCA appropriation. The Army also requires an additional \$37,000,000 for Fiscal Year 1998 to complete construction of the required facilities. The host nation will provide assistance in kind in the form of utilities, land and security valued at \$4,000,000 annually. The Army is pursuing, with the Department of State, host nation support for this mission, but, it is unlikely to materialize in the immediate future. Delaying the Strategic Logistic Initiative (SLI) projects pending negotiations, increases significantly the risk of not being ready to execute contingency commitments in this region.

During the multi-year period, Fiscal Years 1995-1998, the Republic of Korea will fund approximately \$40,000,000 of military construction infrastructure projects associated with the Army's prepositioned heavy brigade set of equipment. The annual operations and maintenance costs associated with the projects will be funded by the US.

## **PART II**

### **ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM (ASMP)**

The Army's implementation plan for strategic mobility is the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP). This program complements the Air Force's C-17 Program and the Navy's Strategic Sealift Program and is time-phased to be completed when these programs come on line. Major ASMP initiatives include lease and operation of prepositioned ships, maintenance of prepositioned cargo and equipment, procurement of containers and rail cars, deployment readiness exercises, and CONUS infrastructure

improvements. Strategic mobility requires efficient rail systems, airfields, and port operations, and installation storage facilities. To achieve this, the Army has committed \$1,830,000,000 in resources from Fiscal Years 1993-1997. An additional \$3,486,000,000 is programmed over the FYDP from Fiscal Years 1998-2003 for total of \$5,316,000,000.

**TABLE 1**  
**ASMP FUNDING**  
*(\$ Millions)*

CATEGORY	FYDP FY98-03
War Reserve Preposition Afloat	\$1,934
Watercraft Modernization	336
Railcar Procurement	71
Containerization	56
Deployment Movement Control	160
Training	110
CONUS Infrastructure Upgrades	819
Total	\$3,486

The ASMP program has grown about 6 percent since the development of the Fiscal Year 1995-2001 program. Our challenge as we continue our multi-year program to correct problems at key deployment installations and facilities is to identify projects that ensure rapid deployment capability while providing the greatest benefit within available resources.

#### **Preposition Afloat Program**

The Army Prepositioned Afloat package provides the critical sustained land combat power to counter the early risk generated between the commencement of hostilities and the arrival, by surge sealift, of the first two Army heavy divisions. It gives the Army the unique capability of establishing a significant armored force inland that is capable of operating great distances from ports.

The Army uses three port facilities for maintenance of cargo aboard the AWR-3 ships. The primary maintenance facility is the Combat Equipment Group - Asia facility

at the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC. The 4-year, Fiscal Years 1995-1998, MILCON program at Charleston for \$53,500,000 includes modifying on-site buildings, staging areas, wharves, five new buildings and a test track.

The ammunition ships are maintained at the Naval Weapon Stations, Concord, CA, and the watercraft and other cargo positioned on the Heavy Lift Prepo Ship (HLPs) is maintained at Hythe, England. The Army reimburses the Navy for operations at Concord and the United Kingdom provides Host Nation Support of the Hythe facilities at no cost to the US.

### **Other ASMP Requirements**

The Army watercraft program provides the supported CINC with a port opening capability, the first piece of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. The watercraft fleet provides support to established ports, and ensures that strategic sealift can be off-loaded when fixed ports are inadequate, unavailable, or denied by enemy action. The Army has approximately 339 pieces of equipment distributed in the Active, Reserve, and National Guard. New procurements through the FYDP include eight modular causeway ferries, three 115 long-ton cranes, and five pusher tugboats.

In Fiscal Years 1993-1996, 829 railcars were procured for prepositioning at key installations for rapid deployment and at select depots for basic load and early ammunition sustainment requirements. The plan is to buy 576 additional railcars during the Fiscal Years 1997 through 2000.

The Army will procure and/or lease 20-foot containers for strategic lift, equipment deployment and storage systems for unit supplies and equipment.

Deployment movement control systems are being fielded to achieve an integrated distribution system from the port through the port to the foxhole.

### **CONUS MILCON Infrastructure**

The Army program centers on the capability to deploy a five-division corps contingency force, with its associated support structure, anywhere in the world in 75 days starting on 18 hours notice. The forces identified for this mission are the early deploying

combat, combat support and combat service support organizations with accompanying and sustaining supplies and equipment necessary to support that Corps.

The ability to deploy forces by air and sea does not equal a deployable Army. Success also depends on transforming Army installations into world class power projection platforms from which the Army prepares and deploys forces. We have embarked on a strategic mobility infrastructure upgrade program designed to enable Army posts to serve as springboards for the projection of forces by air, land and sea to ports of embarkation.

ASMP creates a synchronized deployment effort. The infrastructure improvements include rail upgrades, airfield upgrades, warehousing, and other installation specific projects to ensure deployment timelines are met. The CONUS infrastructure needed to deploy units and supplies begins with the ability to stage and load equipment and supplies into containers, or onto railcars and trucks that will transport the containers, unit equipment or supplies to the designated aerial or seaport of embarkation. Staging and outloading areas should be capable of 24 hour operations, under all weather conditions. The truck loading docks, container stuffing facilities and railheads must be capable of handling the volume of equipment required to be loaded each day. Areas are needed to stage trucks, containers and railcars awaiting loading. Aerial ports of embarkation, civil and military, must support the deployment of unit personnel, equipment and accompanying supplies.

The criteria for infrastructure support for deploying units with their accompanying sustaining supplies is based on:

- installations or depots on which units are stationed or supplies stored,
- arrival date at aerial and sea ports of embarkation (APOE or SPOE),
- speed of outloading the units and supplies,
- assessment of physical condition and adequacy of available transport and outload facilities at installations and depots,
- adequacy of APOE or SPOE to support the reception, staging, and outloading of the units.

Strategic mobility funding for infrastructure as a part of the total Military Construction, Army (MCA) program and the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding is shown in TABLE 2.

**TABLE 2**  
**MCA FUNDING VS ASMP INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING**  
*(\$ Million)*

	<i>Fiscal Year</i>					
	<i>94</i>	<i>95</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>97</i>	<i>98-03</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>MCA*</i>	\$795.4	\$512.4	\$567.8	\$456.6	\$3,366	\$5,718.2
<i>ASMP MCA</i>	\$28.2 (3%)	\$65.3 (13%)	\$50.7 (9%)	\$56.1 (12%)	\$591.2 (17%)	\$791.5 (14%)
<i>OMA</i>	0	\$30.2	\$12.0	\$1.4	\$227.8	\$271.4
<i>ASMP Total</i>	28.2	\$95.5	\$62.7	\$57.5	\$819.0	\$1,062.9

*\*Note: FY94-FY97 Congressionally approved MCA appropriations, not including Planning and Design or Host Nation Support.*

Between Fiscal Years 1994 and 2003, the Army will have committed over \$1,000,000,000 to rail, airfield, road and seaport infrastructure projects via MCA and OMA funding. At the present time, our ASMP infrastructure program is adequately funded through the FYDP.

In Fiscal Year 1994, \$28,200,000 was funded for ASMP and included several improvements at Fort Stewart including a container handling facility, marshaling area, railroad pass track, and an expansion at the ammunition supply point. A mobility warehouse at Fort Campbell and container holding pads at Hawthorne Army Depot were also funded.

Phase one of the Combat Equipment Group - Asia facility in Charleston was funded in Fiscal Year 1995 to provide facilities to support an increase in the amount of prepositioned ships, equipment, and materiel on the prepositioned fleet currently stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This fleet provides rapid response to several theater of operations in the event of emergencies. With the advent of a larger fleet and larger amounts of equipment and materials, the requirement arose for a facility that could maintain the ships and equipment/material on a cyclic basis (approximately every 30 months). The Charleston Combat Equipment Group, Asia Base is a multi-year,

\$53,000,000 project that will begin operations later this year when the first maintenance rotation is scheduled. The facility should be fully operational by Fiscal Year 1999. Other Fiscal Year 1995 MCA projects included an on-post rail project at Fort Campbell and a mobility warehouse at Fort Benning.

The Defense Mobility Requirements Study recommendation to increase the ammunition throughput on the West Coast to equal the available throughput (650 containers per day) on the East Coast was approved in 1995. The urgency of upgrading the West Coast throughput as quickly as possible resulted in the upgrade at Port Hadlock, WA (less than \$1,500,000) being completed in Fiscal Year 1995. Upgrading the Navy facilities at Concord Naval Weapons Station, CA is a multi-phased \$52,000,000 MCA project in Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998.

As mentioned earlier, the Strategic Logistic Initiative (SLI) in Qatar was begun in Fiscal Year 1996 with phase 2 in Fiscal Year 1997. Also in Fiscal Year 1997, we have included railroad upgrade projects at Fort Campbell (\$16,100,000) and Fort Benning (\$9,400,000), and a readiness deployment facility at Fort Lewis (\$3,600,000).

When we first started the CONUS infrastructure improvements program, the magnitude of the program was unknown. Some projects were already in the system while others had to be developed. As part of the Army's efforts to identify and validate needed improvements, the Military Traffic Management Command's Transportation Engineering Agency conducted studies at each of the installations, depots, airports and seaports. The Agency's comprehensive studies evaluated the existing outloading capability for each installation, identified deficiencies, and recommended corrective measures. In view of this, completion of the projects have been time-phased over the near and mid terms to meet Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update objectives.

### Summary

The transition from a forward-based Army to a CONUS-based Army places a tremendous demand on strategic mobility. The ability to rapidly deploy a tailored force at a moments notice anywhere around the globe to respond to crisis, whether to deter aggression or for humanitarian action, hinges on being able to get from fort to port to foxhole in a timely manner. The Army's implementation of the Army's Strategic Mobility Program has modernized and improved not only our deployment capability by rail, sea and air but has significantly enhanced our logistic, operational, and infrastructure



facilities at our power projection installations. We have identified and fixed some of our major problems but our program is still not finished. We are continuing to modernize and upgrade our installations to be premier deployment platforms.

We are committed to supporting the National Security and National Military Strategy through a power projection Army. The Department of Defense and the Army have a plan to modernize and upgrade our power projection equipment and infrastructure and we have directed the necessary resources toward executing that plan. With your support, we will retain our balanced strategic capabilities to respond in the uncertain global environment we now face. As we look into the 21st Century, the Army believes that it is structured to fulfill its roles and missions as a power projection force.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. Thank you

## RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

CHARLES SAMUEL MAHAN, JR., Major General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 27 July 1946, Wildwood, FloridaYEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 28PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Director for Supply and Maintenance, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, 540 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0540, since June 1995MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses

Logistics Executive Development Course

United States Army Command and General Staff College (School of the Americas)

United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS Degree - No Major

University of Miami - MBA Degree - Business Administration

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S)

Spanish - American

Spanish - Castilian

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jul 68	Nov 68	Student, Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, later Supply Management Officer Course, United States Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia
Nov 68	Aug 69	Quartermaster Supply Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Third Supply and Transportation Battalion, United States Army Europe, Germany
Aug 69	Mar 70	Commander, Company A, 3d Supply and Transportation Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany
Apr 70	Dec 70	Assistant Division Supply Officer, 15th Service and Supply Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, United States Army, Vietnam
Dec 70	Apr 71	Company Commander, Company A, 15th Service and Supply Battalion, (Air Mobile), 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam
Apr 71	Sep 71	Assistant Family Housing Manager, Company E, 4th Battalion, United States Army Quartermaster Brigade, Fort Lee, Virginia
Sep 71	Aug 72	Student, Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia
Sep 72	Aug 73	Student, University of Miami, Florida, MBA Program
Sep 73	May 76	Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida

CHARLES SAMUEL MAHAN, JR., Major General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
 Bronze Star Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal  
 Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)  
 Air Medals  
 Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
 Army Achievement Medal  
 Parachutist Badge  
 Army Staff Identification Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Ordnance/Logistics Officer, United States Military Group Colombia, United States Southern Command	Jul 81-Jul 83	Major

As of 11 July 1996

## RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

HOWARD JACKSON VON KAENEL, Brigadier General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 26 October 1946, Fort Knox, KentuckyYEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 26PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 4200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-4200, since June 1996MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDEDField Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
National War CollegeEDUCATIONAL DEGREESUnited States Military Academy - BS Degree - No Major  
Oxford University - MA Degree - Political ScienceFOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) GermanMAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jun 69	Nov 69	Student, Field Artillery Basic Course, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Nov 69	Mar 70	Student, Ranger Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Mar 70	Aug 70	Executive Officer, Battery B, 5th Battalion (Airborne), 81st Field Artillery, 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany
Aug 70	Feb 71	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, United States Army, Vietnam
Feb 71	Jun 71	Executive Officer, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, United States Army, Vietnam
Jun 71	Aug 71	S-4 (Logistics), 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade, United States Army, Vietnam
Aug 71	Aug 73	Student, Oxford University, Oxford, England
Aug 73	Oct 73	Staff Officer, Doctrine Branch, Doctrine, Organization and Test Division, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Oct 73	Aug 74	Student, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Aug 74	May 75	Fire Support Officer, Headquarters and Service Brigade, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 319th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
May 75	Aug 76	Commander, Battery C, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 319th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Aug 76	Mar 77	Assignment Officer, Field Artillery Branch, United States Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia

HOWARD JACKSON VON KAENEL, Brigadier General

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
* Staff Officer, Nuclear Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC	Apr 78-Jul 79	Major
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)/ Chief of Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Washington, DC	May 94-Jun 96	Brigadier General

\* Joint Equivalent

As of 18 June 1996

Mr. HEFLEY. General Mahan.

General MAHAN. Sir, I have no opening statement. I will respond to any questions regarding the logistics side of the infrastructure phase.

Mr. HEFLEY. General, you have no opening statement, as well?

General VON KAENEL. No, sir, I do not. I will be more than glad to respond to your questions.

Mr. HEFLEY. Before we get to the questions, I want to thank Congressman Peterson for being here. In the full committee this morning, we had such a love feast for Congressman Peterson that I did not say anything. I did not know, Pete, whether people were just tickled to death to get you out of here or they were really going to miss you.

Mr. PETERSON. I think that is it.

Mr. HEFLEY. I wanted to say, though, that this committee will really miss you. I have appreciated so much, I think the whole committee has, the input that you have been able to give us from a very practical standpoint having been there as base commander as we struggled with all of these quality of life things that we have talked about, General Miller, so much. You gave a unique perspective that most on the committee do not have. Plus, just from a personal standpoint, you are a friend and I have really enjoyed working with you, so we are going to miss you.

Mr. PETERSON. I have enjoyed working with you. You are clearly one of the leaders here in the Congress on these issues, and I have appreciated your leadership in this last couple of years that I have had the opportunity to work with you and I hate the idea of not doing that. But maybe there will be a day when I will need you again in some other capacity, and I appreciate that opportunity.

Mr. HEFLEY. I hope we will work together again in one way or another.

Mr. Ortiz, do you want to begin the questioning?

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, I would like to echo what you just said about our good friend and colleague that he has been there; he was there. We are going to miss you, and I hope that when we meet again I will be able to call you Mr. Ambassador. I hope that will be soon.

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Sol. I appreciate that.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know that you have got many friends here.

I can assure you that the questions that I am about to ask are not parochial. They are really at the heart of the defense of our country. This happens to be related to the Port of Corpus Christi. In your testimony there was considerable emphasis placed on the capability for rapid deployment of our forces and the need to have ready access to significant and reliable road, rail, sea, and air transportation assets. I am particularly interested in the sealift program and specifically the strategic seaport program. It is my understanding that from February 1995 to October 1995 the Army undertook a broad review of the ASMP, the infrastructure process leading to a reassessment of the program in that regard.

What I would like to know, did the Army take into consideration the impact of base closures on the plan? Because a number of military facilities, including operation bases and depots have closed or are scheduled to close. Did the Army conduct a comprehensive re-evaluation of the strategic seaport program, including either a

change in the number of locations it supports designated under this program? How does the Army designate strategic seaports, and what is the logical process followed in determining how to workload a strategic seaport? And maybe you all can guide me through some of my questions to where we stand on why is it done.

General MILLER. Mr. Chairman, if I might, with your permission, we have a prepared statement we would like to have included in the record.

Mr. HEFLEY. Without objection.

General MILLER. Sir, I will start off. Both General Mahan and General von Kaenel can add in. We have conducted several reviews. One of the questions you asked was the impact of BRAC. Another downsizing measure is on strategic mobility. The BRAC 1995 and the previous three rounds had minimal impact and that is primarily because of a great deal of good work that was done in the previous studies. We tried very hard not to get nailed down to a BRAC site where we were just going to create problems for ourselves, maybe end up investing money that did not have any value added.

Fort Drum was probably the biggest impact. The biggest impact was Griffiss Air Force Base; and as you probably know, the Air Force has dedicated some resources to build an airfield up there at Fort Drum to assuage that problem. The Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne and at Oakland fell under the BRAC list, and both of those are scheduled to be closed and relocated as a single CONUS command. We are in the process of reviewing some 97 different installations that could take that operation as one operation and not two. Otherwise BRAC has had a minimal impact on our ASMP program. Sir, I honestly believe that is the result of some very good work led by Congress and their charter to us. The results have been fairly good. I think if there has been stability in the program, that is where it is coming from.

Mr. ORTIZ. One other question is how does the Army designate the strategic seaports because they have been looking at this possibility, and maybe you can give me some information that I can relate to other—

General MILLER. Sir, I can talk to you in terms of the ammunition requirement east coast and west coast. The biggest limiting factor there is safety in the net amount of ammunition that can be transported through there. When we looked at east coast and west coast to solve that ammunition problem, we ended up with Concord Naval Weapons Station in California primarily because they had the capability to pass that amount of ammunition. To get you the details on how we assess ports like Sunny Point, et cetera, sir, I do not have the expertise with me here today in either General von Kaenel or General Mahan. I will be happy to go back and get you the study that was conducted that ended up with Sunny Point and Concord and provide it.

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. If for some reason you do not have the information now, be sure just to put it for the record later on or call my staff. We want to work with you. There are some questions that have been asked by other agencies and we want to work with you and you can provide that information later on and I can give you a complete statement of the question that I asked you.



General MILLER. Sir, we would be happy to do that.  
[The information follows:]

#### STUDY FOR EAST AND WEST COAST AMMUNITION SITES

The Congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) recommended the development of a west coast containerized ammunition port with a throughput capacity similar to that of the Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina. The Army was given the lead to implement this recommendation. Army tasked the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to conduct an independent assessment of the suitability of selected port sites to load and ship containerized ammunition from the west coast in support of the requirements for the MRS Major Regional Contingency-West (MRC-W) scenario. Only two sites surveyed had the potential to perform this mission in that they have an ammunition net explosive weight capability sufficiently high to handle large quantities of ammunition. These sites were Seal Beach Detachment, Port Hadlock, Washington and Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California. Because Port Hadlock has no rail service and a limited road network, it could not be selected as the main ammunition port. Therefore, Concord was recommended as the preferred site. The LMI study was approved by the Joint Staff and DOD.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just have one more question and then I would like to—

General MAHAN. Sir, while it may not answer the question, I think it has to do with the issue at large. And that is, that the Army through its ASMP studies just as you have alluded to has, in fact, directed that we maintain 15 power projection platforms as in post-camps, installations to do that. I have with me a list of those as well as our support platforms as in enabling platforms. We can give you those, but those, of course, are Army posts.

[The information follows:]

#### POWER PROJECTION LOCATIONS

Power Projection Platforms are identified as Army installations, seaports, and airports through which Active Army units, Reserve Component individuals, and/or mobilized units deploy. The criteria is that the activity must be able to (1) deploy a brigade or larger Active Component high priority unit, (2) mobilize and deploy a battalion or larger Reserve Component Contingency Force Package unit, and (3) house, feed, train, and deploy units. Aerial sea ports must have a capability to throughput deploying units. There are 15 Army installations, 17 seaports, and 14 airports designated as Power Projection Platforms:

Installations	Seaports	Airports
Fort Carson, Colorado	Concord, California .....	Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.
Fort Benning, Georgia	Long Beach, California .....	Hunter Army Air Field, Georgia.
Fort Stewart, Georgia	Oakland, California .....	Lawson Army Air Field, Georgia.
Fort Riley, Kansas .....	Port Hueneme, California ...	Alexandria Airport, Louisiana.
Fort Campbell, Kentucky.	San Diego, California .....	Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas.
Fort Polk, Louisiana ...	Jacksonville, Florida .....	Campbell Army Air Field, Kentucky.
Fort Dix, New Jersey ..	Savannah, Georgia .....	McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.
Fort Drum, New York	Bayonne, New Jersey .....	Griffiss Air Force Base, New York.
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.	New Jersey/New York .....	Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina.
Fort Sill, Oklahoma ....	Morehead City, North Carolina.	Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma.
Fort Bliss, Texas .....	Sunny Point, North Carolina.	Biggs Army Air Field, Texas.
Fort Hood, Texas .....	Wilmington, North Carolina	Gray Army Air Field, Texas.
Fort Eustis, Virginia ...	Charleston, South Carolina	Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
Fort Lewis, Washington.	Beaumont, Texas .....	McChord Air Force Base, Washington.
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin	Galveston, Texas.	





## Installations


## Seaports

## Airports

Norfolk/Newport News, Vir-  
ginia.  
Tacoma/Port Hadlock,  
Washington.







General MAHAN. Obviously, the more that we have directed those as power projection then we have to have the strategic ports that are most closely associated with that. As you are well aware, sir, Beaumont as an example is, in fact, the one that Fort Hood uses. Fort Hood is one of the power projection platforms, so there is a correlation, and we would have to get back to you with exactly what that is. But I can provide at least the power platforms.

[The information follows:]

#### POWER PROJECTION RELATIONSHIPS TO SEAPORTS


The U.S. Transportation Command through its Army Component Command, Military Traffic Management Command, has designated seaports for early deploying Army units. In a west coast scenario these ports close early and late deploying units shift to west coast ports.

Pre-designated ports	Select Army units
Beaumont, Texas .....	1st Cavalry Division.
Norfolk, Virginia, .....	7th Transportation Group (Floating Craft).
Jacksonville, Florida .....	101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
Savannah, Georgia .....	3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized).
Tacoma, Washington .....	Fort Lewis Brigades.
Wilmington, North Carolina .....	82nd Airborne Division.

For general planning, Army units flow through the following ports, which could change with specific scenarios:

Power projection platform	East scenario	West scenario
Fort Bliss .....	Galveston, Texas .....	Los Angeles.
Fort Bragg .....	Norfolk, Virginia .....	Tacoma.
Fort Campbell .....	Norfolk, Virginia .....	Tacoma.
Fort Benning .....	Charleston, South Carolina .....	Oakland.
Fort Carson .....	Norfolk, Virginia .....	Oakland.
Fort Drum .....	New York, New York .....	Tacoma.
Fort Dix .....	New York, New York .....	Tacoma.
Fort Eustis .....	Norfolk, Virginia .....	Tacoma.
Fort Stewart .....	Charleston, South Carolina .....	Oakland.
Fort Polk .....	Beaumont, Texas .....	Los Angeles.
Fort Hood .....	Beaumont, Texas .....	Los Angeles.
Fort Sill .....	Beaumont, Texas .....	Los Angeles.
Fort Riley .....	Norfolk, Virginia .....	Tacoma.
Fort McCoy .....	New York, New York .....	Tacoma.

# INSTALLATIONS AND STRATEGIC SEAPORTS



Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

General MILLER. It may also be worthy to note that those 15 power-projection platforms and 12 power-support platforms are in total 11 less than Desert Shield/Desert Storm time when the number was around 38. It was as high as 52 shortly before Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Mr. ORTIZ. I see. I have another question. The Army's Military Traffic Management Command's Transportation Engineering Agency rendered a very positive report on the Port of Corpus Christi as an ideal port capable of deploying by sea a large-size armored force given the accessibility to Corpus Christi from Fort Hood. And I think that they have done this before where they have moved a bunch of equipment—helicopters and other items and equipment from Fort Hood to Corpus Christi. Fort Sill and Fort Carson are the Army's only helicopter repair facility. What is being done at the Port of Corpus Christi to deal with this list of strategic seaports? And do you support again the deployment or exercise in the future? I know that it has been used to limited areas, but is that a possibility that we can look into that as we move along?

General MILLER. Sir, I would be happy to take that back, provide you an answer for the record because that deals with TRANSCOM which is the joint operation, as you well know, not just under the auspices of MTMC. I think I can give you a much better answer by doing that.

[The information follows:]

#### PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI

Corpus Christi did receive favorable comments in MTMC TEA's study and could conceivably be used to augment our strategic seaports. However, numerous seaports with excellent capability are not selected as strategic seaports. Furthermore, funding limitations prohibit exercising all of our strategic seaports, much less the non-strategic seaports. The Gulf Coast ports' primary mission is to support the Divisional units from Fort Hood. Current plans direct the majority of other forces, to include Fort Carson and Fort Riley (which used the Gulf ports during the Gulf War), to the east or west coast. Therefore, our current Gulf coast capability, through Galveston and Beaumont, is sufficient to meet our requirements.

Mr. ORTIZ. That is fine and I just have one more question, but Mr. Peterson is here and, Mr. Chairman, I know that you would like to ask some questions. I will just wait for the next questions.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Peterson.

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I applaud the opportunity to have this hearing. The infrastructure, I think, or not only the Army process of the modernization which is what this is all about, I think, is going to be a major problem for a lot of years, and I hope that we can meet the needs in time to really make it happen. I am particularly interested in your preposition force and things that you are doing in that regard and also to bring to mind, and I know also your figures I hope include Reserve and Guard requirements, I presume.

The question that I have though is that there are some of the other services that are already engaged in doing some of the things that you are doing. The preposition force, for instance, I do not want and I hope you are working so that there will not be duplication of effort between the Marine Corps and the Army in doing the preposition aspects of this, particularly on your afloat armada, so



to speak. You are going to be doing it in Charleston. They are going to be doing it in Blunt Island. They have been doing it for a long time. Clearly there is some experience base there, and I hope that you are exploring that to make sure that you have ultimately an incredibly efficient process of doing that or even maybe collectively trading back equipment maintenance that can be done that would be useful to both services, given the fact that you are doing a lot of things from a joint standpoint. Is that something that you are looking at in this review?

General MILLER. Sir, I think it has been looked at previously, and it is an ongoing effort as well. The preposition set that you referred to is the AWR-3, afloat preposition set for the Army. We do not think it duplicates the Marine Corps capabilities. We look at them as being complementary of what the Marine Corps can do. Certainly there is a great deal of sharing. There is an MLRS unit that we give to the Marine Corps to enhance their capability. The M-1 tank, we have a requirement to provide the Marine Corps M-1 tanks to flesh out their capability. The AWR-3 package right now, that is probably more heavy ground maneuver combat power than the entire Marine Corps three MPS packages. So that is an additional complement to what the Marine Corps bring to the public.

Mr. PETERSON. You noted Diego Garcia. Will you have them essentially based in the same areas as well, because they are already there?

General MILLER. Sir, at Diego Garcia, we have had several ships in the past. One was the Green Harbor and Green Valley for a while. That AWR-3 set contains more than just maneuver forces; it contains port opening and so on which is somewhat different than what the Marines bring. They get that port opening from the Navy which is also different than what we provide. Our port opening package is substantial.

Mr. PETERSON. My next two final questions are the financial side of this thing. One, is that in 1994, there was a projection that there was a shortfall essentially of a half a billion dollars and now you are up to a billion in the 1996 proposal. Was that just that you had not seen how this was going to fall out or what the projections were going to be? My figures may be in error, I do not know, but that is what we had pulled out of this. It seems like it is double what we originally thought it might be. Is this the right number? What is the shortfall? What are you looking at now?

General MILLER. Sir, right now our program is adequately funded through 2003. A precursor to Army strategic mobility was a study to look at our infrastructure and so on. That was \$200 million-and-some. That was pre-1994 and in the 1994 timeframe. As a result of that study and rolling into ASMP and looking at both the AMC capability in the depots, looking at the other agencies and activities that had to participate—seaports, Transcom capabilities, rolling ASMP and the previous studies together gave us that final figure.

Mr. PETERSON. Sir, the increase went from \$246.6 million in MCA as a result of combining the integrated Army mobilization study with ASMP to a total of \$804 million on the MCA side. Currently after looking at duplication and what the other services were



going to do, example, the Air Force at Drum and so on, our MCA construction program is \$791 million, and it has an OMA piece of \$271 million in OMA innovations. We are comfortable with that. It is in our POM. It is in our FYDP and it is adequate—it is doable with that estimate.

General MILLER. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. PETERSON. Then my final question is we have tried, in this committee particularly, to take some lead on the streamlining of procurement. You are going to have a lot of procurement of construction and a whole host of other things. I see 1,000 railcars, et cetera, here. Are you satisfied that you are going to have the opportunity to negotiate hard to get the best price, or are you going to be locked into some bureaucratic process by which you are going to have to take months of process to essentially get whatever somebody gives you? In other words, we are looking at quality and we are looking at getting the rock bottom price and get some good competitive efforts here and maybe stuff off the shelf out on the street. That is kind of what we are looking on the streamline procedure. Can you give us an overview of, in your procurement mind-set, is it new mind-set or is it using an old mind-set?

General MILLER. Sir, I would like to do some research on that and then on the record come back with a more complete answer. But I will tell you up front that competition is the key thing. Being able to compete things in the marketplace and the tendency—I am not a procurement specialist. I do not think either of my two partners here are procurement specialists, but competition is the name of the game in the Army today. And if we can buy it off the shelf and avoid the R&D cost, the warehousing cost, et cetera, et cetera, that is the direction we are going in every venue that we have from automation to railcars. We are going to compete it, go out to the various vendors, and take the best product and quality and quantity at the best price.

[The information follows:]

#### STREAMLINING OF PROCUREMENT

We are continually striving for new methodologies to satisfy deployment guidance at the most economical cost, while tailoring our Service unique requirements to use rail car assets currently available in the commercial rail industry today. This new mind-set approach led us to explore the feasibility of procuring used commercial railroad cars. Based on a independent rail market survey completed in March 1996, analysis showed the Army can acquire two used rail cars for the price of one new rail car. We have already prepared the used rail car specifications. The procurement bid is based on least cost, in fully interchange condition with all of the commercial railroads, and with at least 25 years of useful service remaining. Quality rail cars are available due to an oversupply of general purpose rail cars that meet the Army's requirements. Contract award is scheduled for February 1997.

Mr. PETERSON. I am happy to hear that. We have just got to get a bigger bang for the buck than what we have had in the past. The military, I think, has been a victim of the procurement policies of this country and with, I hope, the reinventing of Government and some of the things that have been done in that, that you are given a much greater role in making decisions and making selections in a timely fashion to get this stuff up on the line when you need it as well.

General MILLER. Sir, we appreciate your support and the chairman's support in getting rid of some of the bureaucracy and rigidity to let us compete in the open market.

Mr. PETERSON. I appreciate your testimony, gentlemen, and that was my last question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Peterson. Of course, I am probably most familiar with Fort Carson as one of your power projection locations. When I was out there during the August break, we looked again at the railheads and the warehouse facilities out there and I use this as an example because first, I am most familiar with it, but second, there must be other places like this in the Army. Everything was just neat as a pin and well cared for and well maintained—the warehouses and the rails and so forth. The only thing is that the rails are not of the gauge or whatever it is today that you need for today's equipment. And the warehouses were designed and very well designed for a fort that was supplied and where mobilization took place by rail. So the loading docks come up to the tracks and so forth. Now most of that is done by truck, except with the very heavy equipment like the tanks and so forth. The warehouses, neat, well maintained, but World War II vintage, and many of them did not even have restrooms inside of them for workers. They had port-a-potties outside. Many of them not built so that you could use modern forklift equipment and that kind of thing. I know you know what I am talking about, and it must be all over the Army. They must still have this. I cannot imagine Fort Carson would be the only one.

What are your plans for taking care of modernizing these kind of facilities? Because if you look on paper at our capacity, you have got a lot of capacity out there only it is not quite the right capacity for today's modern Army. What are your plans, not just for Carson, but for around the Army?

General MILLER. Sir, first of all at Fort Carson, specifically, we have about \$28-plus million. It starts in 2000 to \$24 million railyard expansion. That takes care of some of the loading and off-loading technologies that are now emerging. In 2001, a truck-loading ramp; in 2002, a mobilization material warehouse. Sir, as you know, we had the 3d ACR there and the 3d brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, key components of first unit out, 3d ACR and followon forces being 4th ID. In everyone of our 15 mobilization power projection platforms, we have a similar program for each of those. Now I will be happy to provide that to you for the record. [The information follows:]

#### INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION

The Army Strategic Mobility Program is a synchronized effort focused on air, rail, road, and infrastructure facilities to enhance our deployment capability. Based on identification of deployment requirements, the following upgrades/modernization projects are planned for our fifteen power projection platforms.

Ft. Bragg: Airfield Deployment Complex, Heavy Drop Rigging Facility, Ammo Staging Area, and POL (Avn Fuel) Storage Facility.

Ft. Campbell: Mobilization Warehouse, Railroad Track, Rail Spur, Barge Loading Ramp, and Passenger Processing Facility.

Ft. Carson: Rail Yard Expansion, Truck Loading Docks/Ramps, Mobilization Warehouse, Railroad Bridge Repair.

Ft. Stewart: Container Handling Facility, Ammo Storage Area Expansion, Railroad Track Improvement, Rail Marshaling Area, Airfield Deployment Complex, Ammo Upload Facility, and Flight Control Tower.

Ft. Hood: Aircraft Parking Apron, Railhead Facility, Contingency Warehouse, Runway Repair, Ready Reaction Deployment Facility, and Tank Trails/Access Roads.

Ft. Bliss: Air Deployment Complex, Aircraft Loading Apron, Ammo Hot Load Area, Tactical Vehicle Overpass, Ammo Staging Facility, Rail Deployment Complex, Contingency Warehouse, Runway Repair, Airfield Lighting System Repair, Taxiway Repairs, and Loading Apron Repairs.

Ft. Lewis: Airfield Deployment Complex, Depot Deployment Facility and Vehicle Staging Area, Deployment Isolation Facility, and Deployment Container Storage Facility.

Ft. Eustis: Deployment Training Facility, Main Pier Upgrade, and Rail Repair.

Ft. Sill: Rail & Container Facility, Unit Movement Facility, Contingency Warehouse, and DOL Warehouse.

Ft. Benning: Mobilization Warehouse, Rail Loading Facility, Aircraft Parking Apron, Runway Extension, Ammo Holding Facility, Deployment Hangar, Contingency Staging Fac, and Repair Runway Elec Sys.

Ft. Drum: Airfield Improvements.

Ft. Polk: Consolidated Rail/Truck Facility.

Ft. McCoy: Rail Maint/Engine House.

Ft. Riley: No Requirements Identified.

Ft. Dix: No Requirements Identified.

Mr. HEFLEY. Do you have similar conditions at a lot of those other facilities?

General MILLER. Sir, we have attacked that aggressively. You will not find those conditions at Fort Stewart. You will not find all of those conditions at Fort Hood, even though Fort Hood has a corps in 45,000 soldiers. A lot of the initiatives to fix warehousing, trucking or truck loading and unloading, as well as railyards, were taking place in the 1992, 1993, 1994 timeframe. Fort Carson was just a little bit slower because they had the 4th ID there which was a follow-on force and a number of alternatives to move them. They could pick up their ammo at the port. They did not have to bring it to the post and so on. So Fort Carson in the priority list was a little bit further down than where they are today. So although those conditions do exit at other posts, sir, the investment that this committee has given us and the resources has allowed us to attack most of those.

General MAHAN. Sir, to that light having just returned from command at Fort Hood, a year and a half ago now, the same facilities that you spoke to in terms of warehouses when I first took command of that COSCOM in 1993, yes, sir, we had no toilets, no latrine facilities at all in the warehouses. We had port-a-potties. We had terrible conditions in terms of heat, no exhaust fans. We had no capability to increase the shelving. It was World War II. Frankly, we put a lot of money into that to help with the—the deputy corps commander, who at that time, was seated to my left right now, and others who recognized the problem. We have come a long way in trying to modernize the infrastructure. Logistics in our Army consume such quantity of our dollars that we have had to do smarter business, and we put our money where our mouth is in terms of trying to modernize many of those facilities. So I speak from experience at least at Hood. I will tell you that dealing with the other poorer locations, that included Bliss, that included Carson, Riley, Sill, that, in fact, all of that is occurring.

Mr. HEFLEY. I am glad to hear that. We put a lot of effort in this committee on quality of life things. That is a feel-good thing that I think all of us can get enthusiastic about. On another committee that I am on, we talk about procuring equipment and that kind of

thing and that can be kind of exciting. This is not real exciting, replacing warehouses and railheads. So it is not very exciting. Do you run into that when you are debating these things within the Pentagon, where are we going to put our priorities? Well, maybe we can get by with the old warehouses and let us do more day care centers and barracks. How does this fall in relation to some of the other priorities that we have?

General MILLER. Sir, I am sure General von Kaenel has some comments here. He is the operator, but I would like to just tell you about a personal experience. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I commanded III Corps Artillery. Nobody in the Army goes to war without III Corps Artillery. And if you remember during that time, we did not have the ATACM missile. I had just completed the test in the use of the missile. General von Kaenel commanded III Corps Artillery a lot better than I did after that. But there were 20 missiles and no version six launchers anywhere and we had to find the launchers from the manufacturer. We took 20 missiles and I had to travel from Fort Sill, OK, to Altus Air Force Base to put them on C-5's to fly them to Saudi Arabia and during that entire time we knew that our mobilization and our deployment capabilities were lagging and we were robbing from Peter to pay Paul to address it. Sir, we just did not have the resources to do that. You remember what the late 1970's, early 1980's, mid-1980's, and late 1980's were like. And even though we did not have the resources to put in quality of life and we certainly did not have the resources to put in strategic. And there was always the philosophy almost that with warning time and risk mobilizing Mr. and Mrs. America in the industrial base where we could fix some of these problems and move on.

You also remember, I am sure, that we were dealing with the 50-80 MOB sites at that time that were all bleeding off resources and you just could not get it done. Sir, to answer your question more directly, one of the things that our collective boss tells us every day is that the mission of the U.S. Army is to fight and win Americas period. And that in order to do that with a CONUS-base force, we have to be able to project power. Sir, the fastest deployment of the 82d Airborne was to Hurricane Andrew, and we could not have done that unless the green ramp and the orange ramp and that flight line were straight. And sir, that was after Desert Shield and Desert Storm and that was one of our initial investments in Army strategic mobility at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base.

So yes, sir, it is not very pizazzy and it does not turn on any bells and whistles, but, sir, we take it very seriously just as we take quality of life very seriously and we try to do that very delicate balancing act. One of the things you will see, sir, is I am not building a lot of warehouses any more. By partnering with the local industry, especially the local community and the private sector, they will deliver the stuff we need when we want it. So a lot of those World War II warehouses I used to beat General Mahan up about, we do not need them any more. They consume utilities, especially electricity, et cetera, that, sir, we cannot afford. So one of my charters, and you can see it in the 1997 program and the 1998-2003 program is an investment in demo—\$20 million in 1997; \$100 million



in 1998-03 to get rid of No. 1, excess; No. 2, World War II wood, so that the resources we do have can go into maintaining and sustaining the class A facilities that are required to accomplish the mission.

Mr. HEFLEY. General, do you want to add to that?

General VON KAENEL. Sir, I do not believe that you will find any commander in our Army that is not passionate about the quality of life of his soldiers. But I think we need to be careful as we define quality of life to make sure that we extend it to everything that will enable that soldier to accomplish his mission and to be sure that he and his family's welfare is taken care of. So many of the improvements in infrastructure, correcting the conditions that you have just described, which are a part of the Army's strategic mobility program, enhance the quality of the soldier's life by enabling him to better do his job.

My experience succeeding General Miller, as the commander of III Corps Artillery, I was there as we upgraded the gauge of the railline at Fort Sill to accommodate the heavy loads and the volume of traffic necessary to outload III Corps Artillery and other units there to meet the warfighting needs of the CINC's. We built additional railhead so we could do simultaneous loading. We constructed warehouses that enabled us to maintain the stocks so that we could immediately stuff the containers and outload the equipment to meet a contingency and to do so in safe conditions 24 hours a day regardless of weather which is an enhancement of the soldier's quality of life because of the satisfaction that he derives from serving in conditions where it is clear that his leaders care about not only the work to be done but the conditions under which the soldier would serve.

If I could extend that for a moment into the broader strategic perspective and help to answer Congressman Peterson's question with regard to some of our Army war reserve, particularly the AWR-3, Army afloat preposition. Those requirements for prepositioning, both afloat and in-country are established as a result of the congressionally mandated "Mobility Requirement's Study" that came in the aftermath of operations in the gulf. They are validated within the Department of Defense and they reflect the requirements of our warfighting CINC's. They are not duplicative. The brigade afloat two Army battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions that the Army has as the core of its AWR-5 prepo afloat. And the sustainment capability behind that, as well as the theater and port opening capacity within that set give us both in the gulf and should it be employed elsewhere, the capability to put ashore a very potent brigade combat capability that can sustain it, that can come off of the ships, move through the ports, be appropriately outloaded through a procedure that we call RSOI (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration) into the combat force and to be capable of conducting the prompt and sustained combat operations which are the Army's title X responsibilities. They do not duplicate the capabilities of our comrades in arms in the Marine Corps and they do satisfy the CINC's requirement. And I would tell you, sir, that we are now able, unlike the time of Desert Storm and relevant to affairs of the moment, to have that brigade in place capable of conducting combat operations with-

in the 15 days of its alert and movement which is set by those mobility requirement studies that meet the CINC.

Mr. HEFLEY. I could tell, general, as I was describing the conditions at Fort Carson they were not unfamiliar to you.

General VON KAENEL. No, sir, not at all.

Mr. HEFLEY. You have seen those kind of things before.

Mr. Ortiz, I have some other questions, but I do not want to do it all here.

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. I have had a number of discussions with the Army over the last several years regarding the transfer of the whirltower from Pensacola, FL, to Corpus Christi on the depot. It is my understanding that following a reevaluation of its requirements that the Army has expressed a need for this facility and requested reprogramming action to begin the dismantling process. It has come to my attention that the budget depot at DOD have not necessarily agreed with the need assessment. However, in reading the documents from the Comptroller's office, I am convinced that a determination was made based on incomplete information and certainly a lack of understanding of the funding and workload, work force constraints in the depot system. I also understand that there's additional information being developed within the Army to further explain the increasing requirements to move the whirltower to Corpus Christi, our main depot. I strongly support this effort and would like to get an update on where the Army is in the process and how close are we there to getting it to Corpus Christi?

General MAHAN. Sir, I would only tell you that your information is correct. We have gone back. We have developed more information that says that, in fact, the whirltower will be needed for the quantity of work that we believe will be going there; that is, in fact, programmed to go there. We have provided that data back to the OSD, and we are still in consultation with them to try to effect that transition. We believe that it is cost effective. By the way, it does not exceed the color-of-money issue that was alluded to, \$300,000, that are currently within the purview of the Corpus commander and that is an issue we have taken back. I cannot tell you what their response will be, sir, but certainly with your support, the Army is ready to go ahead as you and I discussed several months ago.

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir, we appreciate that. I really do. I just have one more question. At Corpus Christi, our main depot, we lease from the Navy and we put some language there to put some monies in currents to spend at least \$20 million to make some of the corrections that are needed—the roads, the sewage system, and all that. And we hope that the Army and the Navy have been working together to upgrade those conditions that are deplorable. Have you met with the Navy? Have you had any discussions to see what can be done and how far are we from getting there to make some improvements?

General MILLER. Sir, the local Army commander at Corpus Christi has had several sessions with the Navy there to work out the specific work orders and requirements. I do not have a current update. I will get one and bring it to you and make sure that you get it.

Mr. ORTIZ. I appreciate that. One other question that I wanted to know. Sometimes we include language in the bill that we feel as we do that that is a priority and we request that hopefully you will spend so much money. How does that fall in the priorities of all the other stuff that you have to do, the language that we put in? I mean does that have any bearing at all?

General MILLER. Sir, I did not do any research over history to say whether or not we did or did not follow a Congressional language, but I think in the main, you would find it to be pretty close.

Mr. ORTIZ. Very good. I would like to say, we have had tremendous relationship in Corpus Christi with you and the Navy, and we want to work with you. We are the only, as you well know, helicopter repair service for Army. Now we are doing a little Navy work as well. But the conditions are deplorable and I hope that maybe—you have got my support getting you and the Navy to work these things out. We would really appreciate it.

Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. If you do as we go along, Solomon, just interrupt me here. I have several questions I would like for us to deal with and get some answers on the record. The fiscal year 1994 budget request indicated that the infrastructure cost to support the Army's strategic mobility requirements would amount to approximately \$550 million. The anticipated costs are now significantly larger than that, and the time to complete the programming for infrastructure upgrades has been extended to fiscal year 2003. I guess there are three factors here that we ought to address. What are the principle factors which have led to an apparently significant increase in the infrastructure cost to support the strategic mobility, first; and second, did the Army adequately understand the infrastructure tail for strategic mobility at the time the original planning was done; and third, how have changes and assumptions about the procurement of equipment, for example, rail equipment, containers and watercraft affected the assessment of what is needed on the facilities side?

General MILLER. Sir, if I might address the first part of your question which was the increase and the cost of Army strategic mobility between initial studies and where we stand today. I think adding the AMC requirements of the depots, et cetera, as support structures necessary to make ASMP holistic and whole, is part of the issue. The second part, I believe, is the MTMC piece seaports, the various requirements for outloading at the seaports, and so on. So what we started with as early as in 1992 was the Integrated Army Mobilization Study which was the forerunner to ASMP. That identified about \$246 million and between 1992 and 1994, that number kind of went up and went down with MOB sites, numbers of ports to be used and so on. But that study only included FORSCOM and TRADOC installations; and it primarily dealt with airfields, rail improvements, and storage. And we add the seaports, the ammunition requirement, east coast, west coast, the seaports, and the other AMC depots pieces, that AMC bill rose to about \$800 million, \$804 to be exact.

Today our funding is at \$791 million for MCA and \$271 million for OMA. We have that in our program 1998–2003. By adding AMC

and MTMC, yes, sir, it caused us to expand by about 2 years from 2001 to 2003. The balancing act between quality of life, ASMP, et cetera, et cetera, I think requires us to do that. Is that an acceptable level of risk, sir, I believe so at this time. We think we are stabilized. We think we are adequately funded to accomplish our ASMP mission.

Mr. HEFLEY. Did the gulf war give us—is one of the fallout benefits of the gulf war a better picture of what we needed? All of a sudden it wasn't theoretical. It was very practical. And did that figure heavily in your planning for the future?

General MILLER. Sir, the things that happened to us at Fort Stewart and Fort Campbell and Altus Air Force Base and so on, I think, had a significant impact. It allowed us to apply something other than theory to what is really required to get things moved. Additionally, sir, you know we had participated in numerous Re-forged exercises, numerous focus exercises in Korea and other Korean exercises, but never on the scale and intensity that had to be executed during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Fort Hood has always had a requirement to move a lot of rail cars. The requirement for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was 380 rail cars a day. We had looked at Fort Hood, but we never looked at a couple of exchanges, about 27 miles or 27 rail miles down the road, and we ended up putting trains on sidings, et cetera, et cetera, because we did not have a turntable capability, et cetera, just the intensity, the volume and the number of places that had to be pulled together. I think additionally we were trying to deal with MOB sites to minimize the travel time for reserve component units, et cetera, so that they could get to a MOB site quickly and start their train up to deploy.

Sir, the 142d Brigade, a field artillery brigade out of Arkansas, had to get to Fort Sill in a hurry for a followup trip to Beaumont and I had 2 weeks to put them on the ship and about 4 weeks to put them on the plane. It was just something—the world had changed. We were changing, but not nearly as fast as Desert Shield/Desert Storm required us to change. We have now made that transition.

General MAHAN. Sir, I would only add that that understanding of the changes was not relevant only to the continental United States. I was assigned in Europe in the VII Corps that had to do the same kind of relook because we had always received these huge shipments from the United States; however, we had not deployed from that time to do that. I think that you see the current operation joint endeavor where a sizable force has again redeployed from the central region of Europe to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of us having fixed, albeit with NATO infrastructure money, the same requirements to be able to deploy. So I think our Army throughout the world has understood now that wherever you are you must be able to deploy. Again, there was never that concept when we were in Europe the first time until we had to do it. I think Operation Joint Endeavor [OJE] is a clear example of having learned from that mistake and having fixed many of the problems.

Mr. HEFLEY. General, did you have another comment?

General VON KAENEL. I was going to offer, Mr. Chairman, also that one of the things that was helpful as a lesson learned out of



the experiences in the gulf is that it helped the Army identify its infrastructure needs wherever deployed, but it also helped to focus at both the joint level and among our sister services on what we need as the land combat power to get to the fight. So it reinforced within services and jointly some of the balancing act that we do within the Army on our resources, it helped to reinforce areas that were in need of assistance in our sister services to ensure that the capacity was there to allow all of the combat power of our armed forces to be delivered in a timely manner.

General MILLER. Sir, if I might we are in the process of building tins of RO/RO ships, large medium speed roll-on, roll-off. I had an MLRS battalion that on six ships going to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. That is 27 launchers on 6 ships. One of those ships was the *Sea Train Washington*. It left the port of Beaumont six times and everything I loaded was break bulk. It had to be lifted over the side. So just to amplify what General von Kaenel was saying, we have learned some great lessons and thanks to this committee, the resources are being dedicated now to fix those problems.

ASMP in a holistic manner from RO/RO ships to C-17. Sir, what the C-17 has done in Bosnia and Herzegovina could not even be conceived of prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. From the Fort Hood, Fort Carsons to the Stewarts, sir, you will see power projection, the ability to move whether we are going to fight fires in the western United States or disaster relief for Hurricane Andrew. And, sir, when I tell people that the fastest deployment of the 82d Airborne was to Hurricane Andrew, they do not believe it. That is a fact.

Mr. HEFLEY. Data provided to this subcommittee last year suggested that the Strategic Mobility Program is significantly underfunded. At the time the subcommittee was informed that military construction execution through fiscal year 2001 was at 62 percent with over \$310 million in requirements either unfunded or underfunded.

General Miller, your prepared statement indicates that the Army believes that the ASMP infrastructure program is adequately funded through fiscal year DP. Is it accurate to interpret your statement to mean that there are no unfunded or unprogrammed ASMP infrastructure requirements of any consequence through fiscal year 2003?

General MILLER. Sir, that is correct.

Mr. HEFLEY. One of the issues that is of serious concern to this subcommittee is the adequacy and stability of outyear funding for the military construction program, and that has to be a concern of yours too. It does not do you much good if we are very generous one year and cut the stream off the next. Earlier this year, the subcommittee examined current budget estimates and determined that DOD is planning on programming 39 percent less in military construction, including BRAC at the conclusion of the current fiscal year DP compared to the program enacted by Congress for fiscal year 1996. Much of the reduction can be found in the reduced levels of resources required to execute base closures and realignments as the operational closure of installations and facilities reaches the statutory deadline in 2001.

When BRAC is factored out of the military construction top line, however, the budget estimates suggested significant swings in budget authority beginning in fiscal year 1999 after a slow erosion in the early part of the fiscal year DP. Although some argue that outyear planning for installation requirements is an inexact science, the estimates also suggest a serious MILCON pause in fiscal year 2000 for missions of installations not effected by BRAC. The current POM cycle may provide some adjustments that would stabilize outyear programming, but it is too early to tell.

General Miller, the data you present indicates that the Army intends to program \$591 million over fiscal year 1998 to 2003 period for the ASMP MILCON requirements. A back of the envelope calculation based on information made available to the subcommittee would appear to indicate that roughly 53 percent of the CONUS-based MILCON requirement is loaded into the 2001 and 2002 program. How confident are you in the stability of the outyear program?

General MILLER. Sir, ASMP stands aside from the rest of MILCON. If I had one more dollar in MILCON, I would probably put it on barracks, as opposed to ASMP, because ASMP is set up as a specific program funded in the future years program as articulated. I am confident that the ASMP program will stay as it is currently designed. I am less confident that other MILCON, primarily in the quality of life arena, will have that same stability in the out-years.

But I have been chartered by the Chief to explore some efficiency, to get a bigger bang for the dollars that we do have available. I articulated part of that earlier on with getting rid of excess, reducing leases in the Army. We have funded caretaker costs on some of these excess facilities that are going to be given to local reuse authorities. We are trying to leverage technology in the environmental business to cut the cost there which provides us more resources and stability in MILCON. But the bottom line, sir, is I am confident in the program as it is currently configured. And I think the money is going to stay there in ASMP. I would not give you that same degree of assurance, although I am fairly confident that the other MILCON programs will also have that stability.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Ortiz, do you have any further questions at this point?

Mr. ORTIZ. Just out of curiosity, we have got this little crisis going on, do you anticipate that the Army will play a role now that we are having Air Force flying over Iraq?

General MILLER. Sir, I have no information on that whatsoever. I mean I have what has come off of CNN basically.

Mr. HEFLEY. You, too? We know about that.

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. I do not have any further questions.

Mr. HEFLEY. I do not want to tie you up all afternoon. If I might just a few more here very quickly. Because of the length and complexity, and I think sometimes the needless length and complexity of the MILCON planning process, how have you assessed alternatives to new start construction projects?

General MILLER. Sir, first thing we have done, the MILCON process, although that is 5-year money, Maj. Gen. Al Genetti, who

runs military programs and I have embarked on an effort to reduce the cycle time for MILCON down to 2 years—from 5 years to 2 years. Starting in 1998, we will have a full program of parametric modeling, not only to cut P&D costs, but to cut that 1 year, 35-percent design requirement. Reducing the cycle time for MCA is our overarching goal to make that more effective, efficient, better, faster, quicker, smarter, and cheaper. I am not necessarily uncomfortable with where we are right now, but it just takes too long to complete. The best we will do with the 5-year program, it is five times three on inflation. That is a 15-percent increase in every project we have. Sir, we understand that. We have been working that very, very hard between myself and the Corps of Engineers. Sir, I think in 1998 you are going to see some drastic improvement.

Mr. HEFLEY. Are you relying more on repair and maintenance dollars and making do with work-arounds because of the difficulty of programming major projects?

General MILLER. Sir, I would say because of the competition for new construction that there has been a tendency to try to rely on repair and maintenance. Sir, I am not so sure that is all bad. Through congressional support, we have been able to increase the limits on JOT contract. If you can do something today to a range of acceptable standards, it may be a lot better than waiting 3 or 4 years when things deteriorate. So using RPM better, I think, is OK. Using RPM as a substitute and maintaining a substandard facility, to me, is dumb, and we have really tried to avoid that. Sir, I have been dealing in this kind of arena now for the last couple of years. I do not really see that as a major problem.

Mr. HEFLEY. What types of projects are you relying most heavily on the operations and maintenance funding in? Is there a type? There may not be a type. It may just be a case-by-case situation.

General MILLER. Sir, we are using a lot of RPM on utilities.

Mr. HEFLEY. On utilities?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. We basically are doing breakdown maintenance on our utility systems. We have about a \$25 billion capital investment in utilities and about 1 billion dollars' worth of BMAR. That basically forces you into a situation whereby you can only do breakdown maintenance, just keep the electrons and the water and the permits and et cetera, et cetera up to date. One of the reasons for our great interest in privatization is because of that. So I would say that is one of the major areas.

Sir, the rest of the RPM, so we can keep our barracks program going, is in our admin facilities. We have not built admin facilities to accommodate changes in structure or to leverage technology, and we are going to have to address that. So I am working on a plan now to come to this committee, and I am going to talk to Mr. Grone because he always gives good advice about how to get some admin and other type projects into our MILCON programs so we can leverage technology and so on. Sir, we are going to work very closely with the committee and the rest of the committees on the Hill and the other services to make sure that we get that message across.

Mr. HEFLEY. The other thing I have wondered about as I have gone around and looked at the various facilities, a lot of the admin clusters are again are of old vintage, and I would think the wiring and much else about them would not be adequate for today's mod-

ern operation. Have the cost of continuing the operations affected the execution of the OMA dollars dedicated to strategic mobility projects?

General MILLER. Sir, any time we have to embark on a contingency and we do not have the up front money, the result is you can sacrifice fourth quarter resources to pay for that contingency until there is a reprogramming or authorization, appropriation of a pot of money to deal with the contingency. So that has hurt us in the past. It has an impact today. But I think we are dealing with it pretty effectively. We are not sacrificing our near-term readiness. We are taking a little risk. Sir, being in the armed services is risky, so we are dealing with it.

Mr. HEFLEY. Sol, any other?

Mr. ORTIZ. No, I do not have anything.

Mr. HEFLEY. Again, as I said, I do not want to take your whole afternoon. We may have some other questions that we might submit to you to get answers in writing. I think you have given us a real good feeling about where we are now. I think we have a better idea of where we are on this, and we want to be helpful. We need you to share with us where the needs are. I can guarantee you that every time I visit a facility somewhere the commander shares with me what the needs are, and there are a lot of needs out there. There are just a lot of needs. I guess before I got on this committee, I did not realize quite how much World War II, temporary vintage we had in our inventory in the various services, but maybe the Army more than most and that is disappearing. I visited, again back to Carson, I visited the 10 special forces new facilities, and if any of you have been out there and seen those, boy, that is state of the art, is it not?

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. Cutting edge. You look at that and you wish, boy, I wish we could house all of our troops in this kind of facilities because they really are nice and suitable for the value we place on these young people for what they are doing for us. And everywhere I go, there are utilities' problems it seems like. They are old utility systems and then to say nothing of the warehouses and the railheads and the things like that, and the administration buildings and so forth. So we have got an awful lot to do, and we do not have the resources to do it all as quickly as we would like to.

So you have to keep us constantly informed, I think, of where the priorities are so that we can be the most effective help to you that we can be. But we want you to have what you need to do the job. We do not want you to waste a single dollar, of course, but we want you to have what you need to do the job affecting the country and to fight the wars and win the wars. That has to be done. So please let us know, as you have in the past, where the priorities are; and we will work with you and see if we cannot do the best we can with that.

General MILLER. Sir, we will do that. The only shortfall I know of right now is in surge sealift. There was a requirement for 36 RO/RO's; 31 are planned. There is a five-ship delta. Sir, that is being worked, but we would appreciate your support for surge sealift. ASMP will stay on track, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, each and every one of you. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The following questions and answers were submitted for the record:]

**QUESTION FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996**

**MR. HEFLEY/MG MILLER**

**QUESTION #1**

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**MILCON FUNDING**

Mr. Hefley. The Army military construction program is dominated by two principal components over the course of the next several years. The first concerns the modernization of the barracks inventory to provide for a better quality of life for the unaccompanied soldier. The second concerns strategic mobility.

In that context, is there sufficient funding over the course of the current FYDP and within the ongoing POM 98 discussions to accomplish these principal goals without, at the same time, seriously neglecting other operational facilities requirements?

General Miller. The Army has prioritized requirements to be funded within the funds available. The barracks and strategic mobility programs are the highest priority and as such receive the bulk of the available funds. At this time the Army is doing it's best to fund other critical requirements considering affordable limits.

Mr. Hefley. If there is insufficient TOA for Army MILCON in the outyears, what types of facilities are least likely to be funded?

General Miller. The Army prioritizes MILCON requirements for funding based on meeting it's goals of mission, readiness and quality of life, and urgency of need. If there were insufficient funds available, and considering the Army remains committed to the barracks and strategic mobility programs, projects that are least likely to be funded include: ranges, maintenance facilities, storage and administration facilities, etc.



INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. HEFLEY/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #2 a.b.c.

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UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Hefley. The FY 1997 budget request for Army operations and maintenance funding would be sufficient to pay for the lease, operation, and support of prepositioned ships, the care of supplies in storage, and base operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 adds an additional \$27 million for Army strategic mobility priorities which, as I understand it, is sufficient to pay for an unfunded requirement to transload prepositioned stocks from the Ready Reserve Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships to the Large Medium Speed RO/RO Ships. An additional unfunded requirement in that account concerns \$15 million for deployment infrastructure repairs at a number of key installations. Could you elaborate on this requirement?

General Miller. The Afloat Prepositioning Program is funded as the top priority within the Mobilization Budget Activity. Funding this program resulted in an unfunded requirement for deployment outload, which includes infrastructure improvements at Fort Bliss, Texas, Red River Army Depot, Texas, and Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania.

Mr. Hefley. What type of infrastructure upgrades are involved? How important are they to the deployment effort?

General Miller. FY 1997 infrastructure projects involved airfield repairs at Fort Bliss, Texas, road repairs at Red River Army Depot, Texas, and container facilities at Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. These projects are time-phased to fix deficiencies that limit the Army's ability to rapidly deploy from Power Projection installations and have been validated as essential to Army force projection.

Mr. Hefley. What plans does the Army have to fund these projects?

General Miller. The Army will fund these projects in FY 1998 and push the equivalent amount in projects into the succeeding years.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. HEFLEY / GENERAL MAHAN

QUESTION # 3

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DEFERRED COSTS DUE TO CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Mr. Hefley. Have the costs associated with contingency operations affected the execution of OMA dollars dedicated to strategic mobility projects? If so, please provide a detailed list of projects deferred or canceled in FY1996 due to unanticipated costs associated with contingency operations?

General Mahan. There were no strategic mobility projects canceled or deferred in FY1996 due to contingency operation costs.



QUESTION FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. HEFLEY/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION 4

Mr. Hefley. The report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 3517, the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1997, contains the following directive report language:

The Committee directs that the Army program at least \$75,000,000 in the fiscal year 1998 request for the Army National Guard. The Committee directs that no Army funding for overseas classified locations may be expended until the \$75,000,000 is requested for the construction of Army National Guard projects in the fiscal year 1998 President's request. These difficult measures have been taken because for years the congressional direction to adequately fund Army National Guard military construction projects has been ignored.

The legal standing of directive report language prohibiting the expenditure of authorized and appropriated funds, contingent upon a future action of the President, when the underlying funds are not subject to a statutory "notice and wait" procedure is open to question. No similar directive report language appears in any other committee or conference report.

- Can you provide some indication how the Army intends to respond to the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee?
- Has this directive language caused any concern among our friends and allies in the region in question?
- Does the Department intend to move forward with a funding request for the next phase of the Southwest Asia prepositioning requirement in FY 1998?

The witness did not submit a written response for the record.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. HEFLEY/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #5 a.b.c.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE UNIT EQUIPMENT SET

Mr. Hefley. In the prepared statement submitted in advance of the meeting, you indicate that the location for the eighth brigade unit equipment set is still under study by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). What alternatives are currently under discussion?

General Miller. The eighth brigade set has been a JROC agenda item since the completion of the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU). In general, the locations which have been under consideration consist of afloat or ashore options.

Mr. Hefley. Does any option represent a significant infrastructure investment and, if so, does a placeholder for that requirement exist in the outyear MILCON plan to support strategic mobility?

General Miller. Any ashore option will require supporting infrastructure. The Army is not currently resourced to support an eighth brigade set.

Mr. Hefley. When should we expect a decision to be reached on this prepositioned decision?

General Miller. As a result of the late summer JROC meeting, a decision on the location for prepositioning the eighth brigade set has been deferred into the middle of 1997.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. HEFLEY/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #6 a.b.

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JOINT STRATEGIC MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Hefley. In the prepared statement submitted in advance of the hearing, you mentioned that the Army "views strategic mobility as a triad of capabilities: Airlift, Sealift and Prepositioned Equipment." In that context you are a customer for both Navy and, particularly in the case of the C-17, the Air Force. Could you discuss how jointness has affected the development of the strategic mobility program?

General Miller. The complementary balance of US Military capabilities was a cornerstone of the Congressionally mandated MRS BURU, during which the Services coordinated closely with the Joint Staff and OSD. In 1990-1991, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had highlighted the strategic sealift and airlift challenges facing the US Military. Also, coming out of the Cold War, the Army had possessed a large stockpile of prepositioned equipment in Europe, which could be redistributed to vital global locations to moderate the risks to those US interests. With the adoption of a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the US Military again recognized the complementary roles played by the "triad" of capabilities: airlift, sealift and prepositioned equipment. The Army's seven prepositioned brigade sets of equipment provide a physical overseas presence which engages the US with its allies and friends, while concurrently serving as a deterrent force. The sure knowledge that the Army can deploy, within 4-6 days, up to two combat brigades from the continental United States via Air Force airlift, and that those two brigades will be equipped from prepositioned sets in a theater, has served as a powerful deterrent on at least three occasions since 1994. Prepositioned equipment sets moderate risk early in a contingency. However, to defeat a determined aggressor would require the movement of large Army, Marine and Air Force units by sealift and airlift, in the first 30 days of an emergency. In order to move these large numbers of forces early, the Navy is acquiring a surge sealift force of ships which would be immediately available for the movement of forces during the first 30 days of a major regional contingency. Lastly, to insure that Army forces are capable of getting from "fort-to-port," the Army is funded over the POM years to make essential deployment infrastructure upgrades at its power projection platforms. Over the 5 years since the end of Desert Shield/Desert storm, the Congress has supported the evolution of a balanced strategic mobility program which will insure that the US possesses the military means to achieve its National Security objectives.

Mr. Hefley. How closely coordinated are the planning horizons for Army strategic mobility infrastructure requirements and the facilities upgrades required by the other services?

General Miller. Service infrastructure requirements are, generally, managed by each individual Service. When infrastructure issues arise which involve multiple Services, or foreign allies, these issues are brought to the appropriate Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) staff agency for discussion and resolution. The strategic mobility JWCA is chaired by the Joint Staff's Director for Logistics.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. ORTIZ/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #1 b.c.d.

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PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI

Mr. Ortiz. In your testimony there was considerable emphasis placed on the capability for rapid deployment of our forces, and the need to have ready access to significant and reliable road, rail, sea and air transportation assets. I am particularly interested in the sealift program and specifically the strategic seaport program. It is my understanding that from February 1995 through October 1995, the Army undertook a broad review of the ASMP infrastructure process, leading to a reassessment of the program. In that regard, because a number of military facilities, including operational bases and depots have closed or are scheduled to close, did the Army conduct a comprehensive re-evaluation of its strategic seaport program, including either a change in the number or locations of ports designated under this program?

General Miller. No. The Army has realigned its deployment focus into 15 power projection platforms. These platforms are spread throughout the United States. With the current strategic ports located along the eastern, western, and Gulf coastline with a primary mission to support the divisions at Fort Hood, there is no reason to realign the ports based on the current BRAC actions.

Mr. Ortiz. How does the Army designate strategic seaports?

General Miller. U.S. Transportation Command, through its Army component command, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), in conjunction with Maritime Administration (MARAD), selects strategic seaports based on port capability, location, and combined land and sea transit time to the theater of operations.

Mr. Ortiz. What is the logical process followed in determining how to workload a strategic seaport?

General Miller. Strategic seaports are selected based on accessibility (in terms of travel time, transportation infrastructure and capability) to deploying forces and materiel, combined with the sail time to the theater of operations. However, the limiting factor on the number of strategic ports which can be worked simultaneously is MTMC's capability to man the ports. In addition, logic dictates we limit the number of strategic ports to the minimal required to increase the efficiency of command and control.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. ORTIZ/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #2

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PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI

Congressman Ortiz. The Army's Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, rendered a very positive report on the Port of Corpus Christi as an ideal port capable of deploying by sea a large size armored force. Given the accessibility to Corpus Christi from Fort Hood and other power projection platforms at Fort Bliss, Fort Sill, and Fort Carson, as well as the Corpus Christi Army Depot, the Army's only helicopter repair facility, what are you doing to add the Port of Corpus Christi to DOD's list of "Strategic Seaports," and to use the Port for deployments or exercises in the future?

General Miller. Corpus Christi did receive favorable comments in MTMC TEA's study and could conceivably be used to augment our strategic seaports. However, numerous seaports with excellent capability are not selected as strategic seaports. Furthermore, funding limitations prohibit exercising all of our strategic seaports, much less the non-strategic seaports. The Gulf Coast ports' primary mission is to support the Divisional units from Fort Hood. Current plans direct the majority of other forces, to include Fort Carson and Fort Riley (which used the Gulf ports during the Gulf War ), to the east or west coast. Therefore, our current Gulf coast capability, through Galveston and Beaumont, is sufficient to meet our requirements.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MR. ORTIZ/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #3

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PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI

Mr. Ortiz. Your SEDRE (Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise) program would be an excellent opportunity to test the Army's capability to deploy through the Port of Corpus Christi. Over the last three years you have had at least 6 SEDREs in another port in the Gulf of Mexico, including one this month. Do you have any plans to have a SEDRE at any other ports like Corpus Christi? It would seem that conducting such an exercise would be an invaluable evaluation tool.

General Miller. The Army has made great Progress in deployment planning and execution over the past five years. Deployment readiness exercises, known as SEDREs (Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises) have become a cornerstone of the Army's deployment training program. Conceived after Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, SEDREs are in their fifth year of execution, and have proven to be an invaluable tool to insure the earliest deploying units and installations are prepared to deploy through designated seaports. As you know, each Army unit is designated for deployment through designated seaports. The earliest deploying Army units are designated to move through the Port of Savannah, Georgia, the Port of Jacksonville, Florida, and the Port of Beaumont, Texas. In the future, the Army will sustain its deployment readiness by conducting two SEDREs per year. Based on the current requirements, adequate capability exists at the Ports of Beaumont and Galveston. However, if overflow capability is required, the Port of Corpus Christi will certainly be considered.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

QUESTION # 5 a.b.

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CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. Ortiz. What success has there been in providing improvements such as repair of roads and roofs at the depot?

General Miller. Corpus Christi Army Depot is a DBOF installation which operates on revenue generated by its customers in an revolving fund environment. Seventeen projects at a cost of \$6,737,644 were funded in FY96. Six projects have been completed, one to be awarded in September 1996, and the remaining are in process.

Mr. Ortiz. How does the Army prioritize spending of year end monies, particularly as it compares to Congressional directives and priorities?

General Miller. The Army process for year end spending is to validate and prioritize requirements to the level of funds available. A headquarters committee reviews the remaining requirements, and considers Congressional directives. Then we allocate the year end funds to those programs that provide the greatest return on investment, support the Army's ability to rapidly deploy and maintains an improving quality of life for the soldier and their families. DBOF funded installation do not participate in this process.



INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER

QUESTION # 5c

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CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. Ortiz. What plan does the Army have to begin the report required by the FY97 Authorization bill to provide the defense committees with an assessment of the infrastructure needs of the depots?

General Mahan. The Department of the Army continues to track the infrastructure needs of its depots through Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command. The Department of Defense has not yet specified the information it desires from the Army to complete the comprehensive study of the logistics capability and military construction infrastructure requirements identified as Items of Special Interest in the H.R. Report 104-563.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HNSC, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MRS. FOWLER/GENERAL MAHAN

QUESTION #s 1, 2 and 4

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CHARLESTON COMBAT EQUIPMENT GROUP, ASIA BASE

Mrs. Fowler. Assuming that the Army's CONUS MILCON requirements for the Combat Equipment Group, Asia Base are funded as currently projected, how many Army afloat prepositioned ships (LMSRs or other vessels) will the infrastructure at Charleston ultimately be tasked/configured to accommodate?

General Mahan. The Combat Equipment Group, Asia Base/Combat Equipment Base-Afloat (CEB-AF) will accommodate eleven (11) of the Army's ships (eight LMSRs, one auxiliary crane ship, two container ships) at endstate. This number may change based on the results of an on-going AWR-3 Container Ship Study by the Army to determine the best suited and most economically feasible site(s) to perform container ship cargo maintenance. Additionally, there is significant capability to expand at NWS Charleston.

Mrs. Fowler. Assuming the MILCON associated with Charleston Combat Equipment Group, Asia Base is completed as currently projected, how many complete ship-sets of equipment and material could be accommodated (off-loaded, in maintenance, or back-loaded) at Charleston at any one time? What logistical complications might be experienced if more than one ship-set of equipment must be off-loaded or back-loaded at one time? Please provide details.

General Mahan. NWS Charleston provides more than adequate ship docking and off-load capability for several ships. Ammunition off-load however, would be restricted to two (2) piers. Regarding equipment maintenance facility and logistical capabilities, two complete ship-sets of equipment can be accommodated at any one time.

Mrs. Fowler. What logistical complications might arise during a contingency or contingencies as a result of explosive arc limitations if weapons/ammunition handling operations must occur for prepositioning vessels and naval combatants at Naval Weapons Stations Charleston at the same or nearly the same time?

General Mahan. Existing explosive arc adequately supports concurrent prepositioning vessels and naval combatant operations at NWS Charleston.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MRS. FOWLER/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #3.

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CHARLESTON COMBAT EQUIPMENT GROUP, ASIA BASE

Mrs. Fowler. In the event of a contingency or contingencies during which scheduled or emergent operations/regeneration is required, who determines which vessels - prepositioning vessels or naval combatants - will obtain first access to piers and other facilities at Naval Weapons Station Charleston? How will priorities be determined?

General Miller. During times of contingency, the Joint Staff (J4) convenes the Joint Transportation Board (JTB) of which the J4 is the President. Depending on the situation, the J4 makes a recommendation to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who makes the decision. The Joint Staff's Logistics Readiness Center then directs execution of CJCS decision.



INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE  
ARMY STRATEGIC MOBILITY  
12 SEPTEMBER 1996

MRS. FOWLER/GENERAL MILLER

QUESTION #5.

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CHARLESTON COMBAT EQUIPMENT GROUP, ASIA BASE

Mrs. Fowler. Given the growth in the program over the last several years, is the Army confident that it has accounted for all necessary MILCON at Charleston?

General Miller. The current programmed MILCON projects, the last being funded in FY 1998, are sufficient to accommodate the eight Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships and the Auxillary Crane ship. The Army has initiated a study to determine the options concerning the two container ships.





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